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Notre Europe
Notre Europe is an independent think tank devoted to European integration. 
Under the guidance of Jacques Delors, who created Notre Europe in 1996, 
the association aims to “think a united Europe.” 
Our ambition is to contribute to the current public debate by producing 
analyses and pertinent policy proposals that strive for a closer union of 
the peoples of Europe. We are equally devoted to promoting the active 
engagement of citizens and civil society in the process of community 
construction and the creation of a European public space. 
In this vein, the staff of Notre Europe directs research projects; produces 
and disseminates analyses in the form of short notes, studies, and articles; 
and organises public debates and seminars. Its analyses and proposals 
are concentrated around four themes:
• Visions of Europe: The community method, the enlargement and 
deepening of the EU and the European project as a whole are a work in 
constant progress. Notre Europe provides in-depth analysis and proposals 
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that help find a path through the multitude of Europe’s possible futures.
• European Democracy in Action: Democracy is an everyday priority. Notre 
Europe believes that European integration is a matter for every citizen, 
actor of civil society and level of authority within the Union. Notre Europe 
therefore seeks to identify and promote ways of further democratising 
European governance. 
• Cooperation, Competition, Solidarity: « Competition that stimulates, co-
operation that strengthens, and solidarity that unites ». This, in essence, is 
the European contract as defined by Jacques Delors. True to this approach, 
Notre Europe explores and promotes innovative solutions in the fields of 
economic, social and sustainable development policy.
• Europe and World Governance: As an original model of governance in 
an increasingly open world, the European Union has a role to play on the 
international scene and in matters of world governance. Notre Europe seeks 
to help define this role.
Notre Europe aims for complete freedom of thought and works in the spirit of 
the public good.  It is for this reason that all of Notre Europe’s publications 
are available for free from our website, in both French and English: www.notre-
europe.eu. Its Presidents have been successively, Jacques Delors (1996-2004), 
Pascal Lamy (2004-05), and Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (since November 
2005)
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Introduction
On 3 November 2009, Czech Republic President Vaclav Klaus formally 
ratified the Lisbon Treaty, thereby bringing to a close the ratification 
procedure and allowing the Treaty to enter into force on 1st December. This 
marked the end of a long crisis which arose following the unavoidable 
abandonment of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
and of the numerous obstacles which had impeded the course of Lisbon 
Treaty ratifications in some European Union Member States. The failure of 
the first Irish Referendum had plunged the Union right back into an all-too-
familiar crisis. Even after the second vote’s positive outcome, a delaying 
law suit before the Czech Constitutional Court and the threat made by the 
British Conservative Party’s leader to challenge UK ratification in a referen-
dum will have kept Europe in suspense. 
Notre Europe feels that the present period of new-found serenity provides 
an excellent opportunity to learn from the recent crisis. The end of the 
saga triggered by the failure of the Constitutional Treaty seems to call for 
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reconsideration of a critical issue for the Union’s future – that of the Treaty 
revision procedure upon which its development relies.1 In this paper, we 
argue that the reform of this procedure should by guided by the long-term 
evolution of European integration, rather than the necessity to come up 
with some makeshift solution to save a particular draft treaty. We hope that 
our proposals will be considered more credible, inasmuch as they cannot 
be suspected of being opportunistic, nor of seeking to change the rules in 
mid-stream. Our goal is not to put out a fire but to prevent new ones.
1 See the study carried out by the European University Institute, Florence, on behalf of the European Com 
    mission,  “Reforming the Treaties’ Amendment Procedures – Second report on the reorganisation of the  
    European Union Treaties,” D. Ehlermann and Y. Mény (Coordinators), H. Bribosia  (Rapporteur), 2000.
I - The Issue
The first crisis symptoms associated with the Treaties’ revision procedure 
date back to the Union’s very creation by the Treaty of Maastricht.  Indeed, 
an initial Danish “No” response had to be overcome, as well as a weak 
French “Yes,” in their respective referendums. Since then, the Union has 
had to expend considerable efforts to reform itself and to come to grips with 
new challenges, starting with its unprecedented geographical extension. 
The only way the Treaty of Amsterdam could be successfully concluded 
was to postpone negotiations on institutional “left-over matters.” Even the 
authors of the Treaty of Nice admit it was a near-miss, rescued by a second 
referendum in Ireland, and an opportunity for acknowledging the limita-
tions of conference diplomacy for such an exercise. 
A new reform was immediately planned, thanks to the Declaration on the 
Future of the Union, and the Laeken Declaration one year later, which 
devised a new method for revising Treaties: the Convention method. 
Despite the progress thus made in terms of transparency and democratic 
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participation, the resulting Constitutional Treaty was once again defeated, 
this time by negative referendums in France and in the Netherlands, not 
to mention the referendums still scheduled in close to one-third of the 
Member States. Hence the Lisbon Treaty signed on 13 December 2007, 
which largely reproduces the substance of the Constitutional treaty, though 
in the –more traditional- form of a list of amendments, without the consti-
tutional “window-dressing”, deemed too cumbersome.
The Irish “No” of 15 June 2008 sparked a new crisis. The European Council 
session of 11-12 December 2008 provided for transitional regimes concer-
ning the European Parliament’s composition, the nomination of the 
future Commission and the Presidencies of the European Council and of 
the Council of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the context was unlikely to 
stimulate European citizens’ interest in the 2009 European Parliament 
elections, which ultimately had to proceed according to the terms of the 
Treaty of Nice. The Irish government finally agreed to seek ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty by means of a second referendum, in exchange for certain 
guarantees granted by the European Council.
This episode should not be allowed to conceal other, albeit less publicised, 
problems which plagued the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification process. It took 
until 6 May 2009 for the last EU member’s parliamentary assembly – in this 
case that of the Czech Republic’s Senate – to finally approve the Treaty. 
Then, as mentioned earlier, it was not until 3 November 2009 that a reticent 
President Vaclav Klaus finally signed the Treaty. President Lech Kaczynski, 
for his part, announced that Polish ratification would be contingent upon 
results of the second Irish referendum, even though the Diet had already 
approved the Treaty. Appeals brought before the Constitutional Courts of 
Germany and of the Czech Republic also delayed the process. All of these 
snags show that a ratification procedure’s success is highly dependent 
upon the Member States’ internal political developments. They are also 
a reminder that ratificationby the head of state is, in the final analysis, an 
international act which does not end with a legislative chamber’s approval 
or that of a population voting by referendum. 
Consequently, in view of the number of Member States and the broad 
diversity of their constitutional orders, any reform of the Treaties inevitably 
appears to be an extremely arduous undertaking.
How can we prevent any future attempt on the part of the European Union 
to reform itself from leading it into another crisis? How can we ensure that 
the EU will not have to sustain its present status quo for many years to 
come in a world changing at an ever-greater speed? How can the Treaty 
revision procedure, and even more particularly the ratification procedure, 
be reformed and made more flexible? 
This is an admittedly delicate matter, inasmuch as it calls into question 
the essence of the existing unanimity-based procedure. It is difficult to 
imagine, under the present circumstances, that a revision treaty might be 
imposed upon a Member State against the latter’s will, such as the Lisbon 
Treaty on Ireland after the initial popular “No” vote. On the other hand, the 
fact that a single State should be able to block a reform sought by all other 
Member States unquestionably raises a democracy problem, in that it 
allows a tiny minority to nullify the will of a large majority. What is needed, 
then, is to strike the right balance. 
Our analysis is meant to build upon an earlier Notre Europe study on the 
future of the Convention method.2 The latter undoubtedly provides an 
initial and partial response to our question, since it is by making the reform 
preparation process broader and more democratic (notably by improving 
the Convention method and bringing it into more general use), that one will 
more readily agree to waive unanimity in the decisional phase.
2 G. Ricard-Nihoul, The Convention moment: Six arguments for its continuation six proposals for its reform,  
    Notre Europe, Policy paper, 31 December 2007. 
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The following is an attempt to explain why it is no longer possible to accept 
the current Treaty revision procedure (II.). We will propose a radical but 
necessary reform – namely that Member States abandon the individual 
veto right they each currently enjoy, while offering guarantees to minority 
countries (III.). There are also other solutions for facilitating the ratifica-
tion procedure process (IV.). This paper’s conclusion will notably stress 
the advantages of limiting and targeting to a greater extent the amending 
treaties’ scope.
II - The Unsustainable Status Quo of the Existing 
      Treaties’ Revision Procedure
The Treaties’ revision procedure upon which the European Union 
relies has remained fundamentally unchanged since the creation of the 
European Economic Community. As was the case in concluding the initial 
Treaties, this procedure relies upon double unanimity. First, during the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which convenes representatives of all 
Member States for the purpose of amending the Treaties under considera-
tion; then later, during the ratification phase,, which calls for an approval 
procedure within each Member State. The latter are free to implement this 
procedure as they see fit, according to their own constitutional framework. 
This normally entails approval by the national parliament or by referen-
dum. The Lisbon Treaty did not challenge these principles other than by 
creating a so-called “simplified procedure,” which can be used to activate 
“passerelles” [“footbridges”] (which make it possible to switch from one 
decision-making procedure model to another). This will be discussed 
again later.
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The status quo in such matters does, however, pose some real risks.
The first is the need to perpetually live with the existing Treaties; i.e., as 
amended by the Lisbon Treaty. Such Treaties include ad hoc arrangements 
– not to mention countless details secured through laborious compro-
mises, which do nont really belong in a major Treaty and are often cha-
racterised by inconsistency. The ongoing Treaty revision process to date 
attests to the need for frequent adaptation. In a constantly evolving world, 
the European Union must be able to reform itself. The existing procedure 
favours conservative Member States which, though comprising a minority, 
are in a position to block any change without having to offer any alternative 
proposal, other than to maintain the existing situation. 
The second risk concerns future attempts to revise the Treaties (when the 
need to adapt will nonetheless be more keenly felt than the small likeli-
hood of reaching an agreement). Barring any change in the current practice, 
the same causes will continue to produce the same effects: namely, more 
crises. Almost nine years elapsed between the Nice Declaration on the 
Future of the Union and the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force. The failure of 
the Constitutional Treaty, due to a coalition of groups with opposed pre-
ferences, and later the Irish “No” to the Lisbon Treaty, generated doubts 
serious enough, in some cases, to stall the activities of European insti-
tutions, which occasionally lost some of their audacity. Considerable 
efforts were then expended in developing scenarios that would help the 
EU emerge from the crisis.3
Crises can certainly be salutary at times and can bring a rebound. However, 
their constant recurrence can be more harmful and even lead to a break-up. 
For example, they could induce a certain number of Member States to 
3 See for example B. de Witte, “Saving the Constitution? The Escape Routes and Their Legal Feasibility,” in  
   G. Amato, H. Bribosia and B. de Witte (eds.), Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution, Brussels,  
   Bruylant, 2007; Ph. de Schoutheete, “Scenarios for Escaping the Constitutional Impasse,” Europe’s World,  
   Summer 2006; S. Peers, “Can the Treaty of Lisbon be ratified or implemented? A legal analysis,” http:// 
   www.statewatch.org/news/2008/jun/analysis-lisbon-june-sp-2008.pdf.
withdraw from the Union, or even create a new parallel structure. Calm and 
thoughtful deliberation as to the best way to reform the revision procedure 
would prevent the necessity of having to adapt this procedure hastily, 
when a new crisis occurs.
Moreover, it is a great temptation to “push for” the adoption of a new 
Treaty when the latter is blocked by a given Member State. A striking 
example of this is the December 1992 Edinburgh Decision which followed 
the first Danish referendum rejecting the Treaty of Maastricht. The aim of 
this European Council decision was to address Danish concerns, particu-
larly regarding defence matters.4 Its legal nature is still in dispute.5 Since 
the entire ratification process could not be done over from scratch, this 
decision had to be implemented without ratification. It was therefore 
deemed to be an international agreement in simplified form and of a 
purely interpretative nature (since a modification would have necessita-
ted starting the ratification procedure all over again),6 which, at the very 
least would have been highly debatable. After the failure of the Irish refe-
rendum on the Treaty of Nice, two declarations were adopted at the Seville 
European Council in June 2002: one by the European Council and the other 
by Ireland in order to reassure the latter as to the perpetuity of its neutrality 
status.7 These served as a pretext to justify holding a second referendum. 
An analogous solution was used to justify holding a second referen-
dum on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. Having formally acknowledged the 
Irish people’s concerns,8 the European Council agreed to provide it with 
the necessary legal guarantees (without specifying when or how) in fiscal 
matters, as well as with respect to the right to life, family life, education and 
4 Presidency Conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council of 11 and 12 December 1992, “Le Dane
    mark et le traité sur l’Union européenne,” Journal officiel, C 348 of 31 December 1992.
5 On this subject, see J. Ziller, “La ratification des traités européens après des référendums négatifs :  
    que nous disent les précédents danois et irlandais?” in Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico communi  
    tario, 2005, p. 365.
6 B. de Witte, see “Saving the Constitution,”, 2007, p. 921. 
7 Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council of 21 and 22 June 2002, Annexes III and IV.
8 See Annex I of the Conclusions of the European Council of 11 and 12 December 2008.
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Ireland’s neutrality. The European Council also rallied to Irish demands that 
the idea of a Commission with fewer members be abandoned and that one 
Commissioner be maintained for each Member State, which, incidentally, 
could weaken the Commission and consequently the Community method.9
As for the Czech Republic, whose President was balking at finalising the act 
of ratification, the European Council of 29 and 30 October 2009 agreed to 
append – on the signature date of the next Accession Treaty (probably the 
one concerning Croatia) – a protocol aimed at conferring upon the Czech 
Republic the same exceptional status as Poland and the United Kingdom 
with respect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights.10
Although such pragmatic solutions managed to be implemented to save a 
Treaty, they cannot serve as a model for the future.11 They give an adverse 
impression of manipulation, or of a refusal to respect the will of the people, 
which is certainly not the best way to bring Europe closer to its citizens. 
Moreover, it would not always be possible to pinpoint the specific concerns 
which, if considered, might change a referendum’s outcome. How could a 
single statement have been an adequate response to the multiple reasons 
for the French and Dutch “No’s”?
Reforming the revision procedure would also make it possible to avoid 
more subtle “abuses of procedure.” The Treaties have, for example, at 
times been adapted or supplemented by means of declarations, institu-
tional agreements, or internal regulations. When implemented, they have 
occasionally been broadly construed by institutions, depending on the 
needs to be met. A flexible revision mechanism would prevent this sort of 
drift.
9 See Conclusions of the European Council of 11 and 12 December 2008, pp. 1 to 3.
10 See Conclusions of the European Council of 29 and 30 October[toujours incorrect dans le texte français !]  
     2009, pp. 1 and 2, and Annex I.
11 Along these lines, see R. Dehousse, “Au-delà du plan B : comment réformer les clauses de révision des 
     traités,” in G. Amato, H. Bribosia and B. de Witte (eds.), Genèse et Destinée de la Constitution 
     européenne, Brussels, Bruylant, 2007, p. 947. 
Lastly, another trend associated with Treaty revision deadlocks consists 
of conferring special status or rules upon reticent States, which make the 
system increasingly complex. Their legitimacy is not always obvious, as 
exemplified by the protocol which allows some restrictions on the right 
of foreigners to purchase secondary residences in Denmark, or even the 
Maastricht Social Protocol. Similarly, in the absence of a consensus on any 
particular issue, governments wishing to move ahead will be inclined to 
reach agreements outside of the Union’s framework, as shown for example 
by the Treaty of Prüm, signed in 2005, to step up cross-border police coo-
peration between certain Member States. 
In short, the current Treaty revision procedure poses many risks, which 
include being permanently stuck with the existing Treaties, or triggering a 
new crisis in case a reform is attempted. It encourages the States to resort 
to pragmatic solutions that cannot be repeated ad infinitum, or even to 
untested manipulations that have little in common with transparency and 
democratic ideals.
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III - A Radical but Necessary Reform: Abandoning 
       Member States’ Individual Veto 
3.1 Legitimacy of the process
Our main proposal is simple. The time has come to stop allowing single 
States to block all efforts to carry out any institutional reform by merely 
opposing it. This is all the more urgent, in view of the fact that the number of 
EU Member States is expected to grow even larger within the next decade. 
It is therefore imperative to eliminate individual veto right provided under 
the Treaty revision procedure.
Although this proposal may seem radical in the context of the European 
Union, it is not revolutionary in relation to other comparable systems.12 
Many international organisations have adopted a “majority rule” – often 
consisting of two-thirds of their Member States – to amend their founding 
charter. Such is the case of the United Nations and of such global organi-
sations as the World Health Organisation, the World Trade Organisation, 
12 See G. Ricard-Nihoul, Réviser les traités européens, p. 12 et seq.
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and the International Labour Organisation.13 This also applies to the 
amendment procedure of the Statute of the Council of Europe, whose 
number of Member States will probably not be much higher than that of 
the European Union in the long term.  
The “double unanimity” required when the European Communities were 
created was justified by the limited number of its members. It was later 
rationalised as the last safety net before a certain number of policies whose 
development would direct affect Member States’ interests were admitted 
into the Community system. Today, without having become a federal super 
state, the Union has attained a sufficient degree of maturity and sense of 
solidarity to consider abandoning the unanimity rule. 
It is in all of the Member States’ best interest that the Union continue to 
reform, even if one government may occasionally have to accept a rule 
which it does not favour. We are also convinced that, at this stage of the 
integration process, abandoning the veto right would satisfy the Union’s 
growing aspirations for greater democracy and transparency.
The unanimity rule disregards the Union’s twofold legitimacy principle 
based upon not only its Member States as such, but also upon their popu-
lations. Is it right that the refusal of a few hundred thousand inhabitants 
should be allowed to block a reform desired by the representatives of five 
hundred million people? Is it reasonable that a reform’s success should 
be dependent upon the consent of six or seven different parliamenta-
ry assemblies, in a federal country such as Belgium? By way of compa-
rison, an organisation such as the International Monetary Fund, which 
affects the financial sovereignty of these members, resorts to a mixed 
approach: amending its Statutes requires a “dual majority” of three-fifths 
of the Member States, representing 85% of the allocated votes weighted 
13 It should be stressed that, in the case of the UN Charter, the Security Council’s five permanent Member  
      States must also approve the amendments. Idem for the ILO, which requires the approval of five out of  
      the ten most industrialised countries. 
according to each member’s financial contribution.14 Why should the 
Union uphold a crippling rule?
Unanimity also tends, in another way, to favour the “large” Member States 
whose greater political weight is irrefutable: while no one contemplated 
the possibility to have the French vote again after their “No” response to 
the European Constitution, the Irish, were induced to repeat a fruitless 
referendum on two occasions?
Lastly, the unanimity rule determines how, and in what spirit, the texts of 
the Treaties are to be negotiated. The latter, often subject to bargaining or 
sometimes even blackmail, are highly complex and the result may ultima-
tely lack overall coherence. Abolishing the veto right would mean that indi-
vidual positions could no longer be decisive. This would lead to more open 
debates, obliging the protagonists to defend their positions, and would 
make it easier to strive for a common interest that would not merely corres-
pond to the sum of individual interests. This would also allow other actors, 
such as the European Parliament and the national parliaments, to better 
make themselves heard. All of this it should be stressed, without threa-
tening the Member States’ fundamental interests, because giving up the 
right of veto does not imply switching to a purely majority-rule approach 
and is not incompatible with maintaining a highly consensual procedure.
3.2 A concrete proposal: The entry into force of a Treaty      
       ratified by four-fifths of the Member States
As seen above, unanimity is actually required at two stages: when the 
Treaties are signed and at the ratification stage.
14 Article XXVIII of the IMF Statutes.
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The Constitutional Treaty’s setbacks, and later on those of the Lisbon Treaty, 
show that the thorniest problems arise at the time of ratification. It would 
nonetheless seem advisable to take a larger step further and also waive 
unanimity at the Intergovernmental Conference level. Without that effort, 
a “common accord” in the IGC is likely to be even more difficult to obtain 
inasmuch as the Member States know that they would no longer enjoy 
their individual veto rights at the time of ratification one should therefore 
envisage  a sort of “superqualified” majority at the IGC stage – four-fifths 
of the Member States, for example, representing four-fifths of the popu-
lation, in order to meet the dual legitimacy requirement. Furthermore, it 
could also be ruled that a blocking minority can only be constituted by 
rallying at least two or three Member States, the idea being to mitigate 
the preponderance of the most populated states, in accordance with the 
new definition of “qualified majority” set out in the Lisbon Treaty (which 
requires a blocking minority to include at least four Member States).
With respect to the ratification procedure, it would appear advisable 
to refer back to the provisions of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, which 
provided that, after a given time limit following the signing of the Treaty, if 
the latter had been ratified by four-fifths of the Member States, and “one 
or more Member States have encountered difficulties in proceeding with 
ratification (…), the matter should be referred to the European Council.15 
It was not stipulated, however, what the European Council could do, and 
that is the crux of the problem. It would be appropriate to at least allow the 
European Council the option of setting a new time limit for ratifications not 
yet completed.
15 Declaration 30 annexed to the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. The same formula- 
     tion was retained for the entry into force of any future revision treaty (Article IV-443, § 4 of the Draft Treaty 
     Establishing a Constitution for Europe). The Lisbon Treaty also retains the formulation within the frame- 
     work of the Treaty revision procedure, Article 48, § 5 TEU).
The Treaty ratified by four-fifths of the Member States would enter into 
force erga omnes, meaning that it would also bind the States which 
would not have ratified the Treaty. Here too, it could be required that this 
majority include four-fifths of the population (particularly if this ratio has 
not already been attained at the IGC stage), and the terms relating to the 
blocking minority should be similar th those contemplated for the ICG.16
3.3 Minority State guarantees: Withdrawal, differentiation  
       and institutional protection
The principle of withdrawal from the Union on a purely voluntary basis, 
and irrespective of a revision procedure, is now unanimously accepted: 
after being established by the Constitutional Treaty, it was reiterated in the 
Lisbon Treaty.17 This settles a doctrinal debate on the subject, and the with-
drawal procedure was spelled out, notably providing for the signing of an 
agreement between the Union and the State wishing to withdraw in order 
to set out the terms of the withdrawal while taking future relations into 
account. However, it would be justifiable, when a Member State chooses 
to withdraw from the Union because of a Treaty revision which it deems 
unacceptable, to grant it additional guarantees in terms of certain esta-
blished privileges. It might notably wish to keep on influencing the deve-
lopment of that part of the Community acquis which would continue to 
apply to itself (as did, for example, Norway and Iceland with respect to the 
Schengen zone, of which they are a part). One way to allow this would be 
to grant the right for the State concerned to rejoin the European Economic 
Area. The formation of a “rear guard” which would more or less preserve 
the acquired rights of States withdrawing from the Union could draw 
16 See this proposal’s legal formulation in the Annex.
17 Article 50 TEU.
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inspirationform the “Penelope Project” of the European Commission,18 
which developed this idea. 
Another possible guarantee for the marginalised States would be to allow 
them to take advantage of a so-called “opt-out” clause, which would 
provided that a section of the new Treaty would not apply to them (partial 
differentiation). This option could be activated either prior to the Treaty’s 
entry into force,19 or thereafter.20 Such a solution would not be possible 
in all areas, however. Differentiation is conceivable when implementing a 
policy, as demonstrated by the EMU, in which only certain Member States 
participate, but it is possible during the various stages of the legislative 
co-decision procedure, which cannot be but the same for all.21 
A similar technique would be to provide for a differentiated entry into 
force of a revision treaty which would only bind Member States that have 
approved it. Contemplated several times before, notably in the 1984 
Spinelli Project, this formulation was challenged on grounds that it was 
technically impossible to ensure the co-existence of two different treaties 
within a single organisation. Within the European Union, the Treaty of 
Nice could not have co-existed with either the Constitutional Treaty or the 
Lisbon Treaty.
If it is used when revision treaties are being negotiated, this technique 
would open up new opportunities, not in institutional matters but with 
regard to the transfer of competencies or implementation of policies. 
18 Namely, the Draft Constitution formulated by the European Commission during the work of the Conven-
tion (European Commission, Feasibility Study: Contribution to a Preliminary Draft Constitution of the 
European Union, Working Document, 4 December 2002, p. XI, and Article 4 of the Agreement on the Entry 
into Force of the Treaty on the Constitution of the European Union).
19 To be compared with the “constructive abstention” system currently provided for within the CFSP imple-
mentation framework, which allows States placed in a minority to accept decisions without being individu-
ally bound by the latter, while retaining the option of blocking the decisions’ adoption (Article 23 TEU).
20 It would then be necessary to provide for an “opt-in” clause which would allow the situation, where ap-
propriate, to be “regularised” without the necessity of formally revising the Treaties.
21 Defining the topics which could be subjected to a differentiated approach should, a priori, be done 
either abstractly within the mechanism of the general revision procedure, or concretely, in the revision trea-
ties themselves.
For example, a revision treaty could be modelled after the Agreement on 
Social Policy signed by eleven member States and annexed to the Treaty of 
Maastricht which notably provided for “the suspension of any voting rights 
in the Council for non-participating States.” Thus the co-existence between 
the Group of Eleven and Great Britain (which did not wish to be a member), 
was properly maintained.
Lastly, the rights of minority States could be preserved by providing for 
neutral bodies to intervene in the procedure as arbitrators. The European 
Commission and European Parliament as guarantors of a certain common 
interest, could be afforded a right of scrutiny (approval for the former, 
assent for the latter), in order to avoid any hegemonic drift. The Court of 
Justice might also be induced to intervene, in a manner similar to what was 
provided for under the former ECSC Treaty. It would mainly ensure com-
pliance with the procedures and guarantees offered to minority members. 
The measures, aimed at further legitimising the revision process befo-
rehand; such as resorting to a Convention, would also make a majority 
decision more acceptable in most people’s opinion. 
3.4 Recommended way to reform the revision procedure
Theoretically, even under the Lisbon Treaty, any change in the revision 
procedure requires the double unanimity mentioned earlier.22 The 
proposed reform may have better chances of succeeding if it is imple-
mented calmly, without being associated with any other sensitive issue. It 
nonetheless remains a major change, as it is predicated upon unanimous 
States abandoning their veto right.
Is this an insurmountable problem? In other words, shouldn’t the Union’s 
Member States be entitled to depart from the revision procedure set out 
22 Article 48 of the TEU. 
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in Article 48 of the TEU, e.g. by making a revision treaty’s entry into force 
contingent upon ratification by four-fifths of them, or by coupling this 
provision with the aforementioned right of withdrawal and guaranties for 
minority members? It should first be stressed that, in 2002, the Convention 
method was added to the procedure referred to in Article 48 of the TEU 
without having been explicitly provided for. Next, from the vantage point 
of international law, it is not unorthodox to anticipate that a change of 
procedure may directly apply to the revision treaty being drafted, even if 
it would mean challenging certain case law of the Court of Justice (which, 
in principle, requires strict compliance with the terms of Article 48 of the 
TEU). The revision treaty would thus be viewed as a “successive” treaty 
which replaces the former treaties,23 or as a “complementary” treaty, within 
the meaning of the Vienna Convention. It should, however, ensure that the 
“acquired rights” of the States which do not adhere to it are maintained in 
accordance with the precepts of the latter Convention.24 
A similar approach was proposed by the European Commission’s “Penelope 
Project” mentioned above, the originality of which was that it made the 
entry into force of the Draft Constitution contingent upon the entry into 
force of a separate agreement, which could have in fine been ratified by 
only five-sixths of the Member States. The departure from Article 48 of the 
TEU was compensated by safeguards for the vested rights of the minority 
States which, in this instance, would have nonetheless been forced to 
withdraw from the Union.25
On the national level, the situation could turn out to be more delicate. 
For example, Parliamentary approval could be viewed as “an internal rule 
of law of fundamental importance.” likely to challenge the validity of the 
revision treaty concerned.26 Consequently, the loss of a veto right at the 
23 Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, paragraph 3 in particular.
24 Regardless of whether the revision treaty is considered as a new successive treaty (Article 30, § 4 of the  
     Convention) or as an amending Treaty (Article 40, § 4(b) of the Convention), only ”the treaty to which both 
     States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.”
25 “Penelope Project,” p. XII, and Article 6 of the Entry into Force Agreement in question.
26 Article 46 of the Vienna Convention.
time of the Treaties’ revision could have the same effect. 
Although our approach may be deemed “revolutionary,” it appears more 
legitimate, especially if carried out in plain view, than other aforementio-
ned “abuses” of procedure discreetly done in the past
Moreover, the persistent blocking tactics which are preventing any remotely 
ambitious reform from being realised – even when desired by a large 
majority of Member States – might ultimately lead to a much more radical 
break. The “reformist” Member States could be tempted to create a new 
structure alongside that of the Union’s, which is bound to be weakened as 
a result. To elude the pressure being placed upon the new structure27 by 
Community law, they could ultimately decide to withdraw en masse from 
the Union. In many respects, a smooth transition to a principle of reform 
based upon a “superqualified” majority is preferable to a scenario of this 
type.
27 Indeed, a group of Member States is entitled to establish co-operations outside of the Union, provided  
       that they do not adversely affect its existing rules and policies, in accordance with primacy and 
      pre-emption principles.
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IV - Other Proposals to facilitate the ratification 
       procedure 
4.1 Making the ratification procedure more “Europeanised”and 
      flexible
Although our priority recommendation is that veto rights be abandoned, 
other methods would also enable the ratification procedure to be made 
more flexible, or even help to Europeanise it. 
Under the current procedure, parliamentary assemblies (or populations, in 
the case of a referendum) are typically presented with the fait accompli of a 
Treaty already negotiated by their respective governments, without having 
been involved in this process. Their only option is to either accept or reject 
the entire agreement. In view of the complexity of such agreements, the 
multiplicity of issues and actors already involved in the negotiation, this 
binary constraint seems inappropriate. The gap between these two stages 
is all the more prejudicial in that the national debates over ratification are 
decided more by national political issues, or even by ad hoc coalitions. 
Hence the many hurdles which have impeded the most recent reforms of 
European Treaties.
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The need has therefore arisen to promote a freer dialogue between the 
national and the European levels.28 For example, it would be possible to 
provide that, once a political agreement has been concluded between 
the governments, the definitive signing of the revision treaty should be 
preceded by a concertation with the national parliaments, in order to be 
able to fine-tune the text, where necessary, and take into account any point 
which one of them may deem important. That would avoid the necessity of 
having to start over the entire ratification process from scratch each time 
such adjustments have to be made. As R. Dehousse so rightly concluded, 
the mere fact that this dialogue can occur and that citizens can have a say 
– either directly or through their representatives – in the reform process to 
the point of interfering with the negotiations between the States would in 
itself be a positive factor, likely to establish the legitimacy of the system 
as a whole.29
To avoid polarising the debate over exclusively national issues, it 
would also be advisable to “Europeanise” the ratification procedure. 
Contemplating a centralised ratification procedure at the European level 
would no doubt be tantamount to a federalisation of the European Union, 
which many would consider unacceptable, as recently reiterated by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court. Without venturing as far as that, the 
procedure’s European dimension could still be strengthened. For example, 
on the occasion of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, it had been proposed 
that a referendum could be held in all of the Member States that would 
have allowed it, possibly in tandem with European elections. 
Failing that, the Treaty ratification procedurescould at least be coordi-
nated at the European level, for example, by calling for a relatively short 
deadline in order for the States which have signed the Treaty to announce 
their position on its ratification, which would also strengthens the focus on 
28 R. Dehousse, “Au-delà du plan B,”  2007, p. 952.
29 Idem, p. 953.
common issues. However, it seems less realistic to challenge the principle 
of procedural autonomy by interfering with the various national ratifica-
tion practices, notably the choice between a referendum or parliamentary 
vote process.
4.2 Strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the revision 
        process preceding the ratification procedure
The “double unanimity” issue also should, be considered within the 
context of the overall revision procedure, from the initial preparation stage. 
Generally speaking, strengthening of the process’s democratic legitimacy 
would help to lessen the risks associated with ratification.
As for the Treaties’ preparation, negotiation and signing, the Convention 
model undeniably affords some progress in terms of transparency, delibe-
ration and thus of legitimacy. The experiences of the first two Conventions 
showed that the exercise could make it possible to overcome obstacles 
that have been stumbling blocks for “traditional” intergovernmental confe-
rences. Nonetheless, numerous aspects of this model could be improved.30 
For example, the direct election of at least part of the Convention’s repre-
sentatives would have the effect of enhancing the Convention’s political 
representativeness, reinforcing its legitimacy in relation to governments 
and also increasing media coverage of its debates and deliberations. 
One particular problem lies in the sequence between the Convention – in 
which representatives of national governments are brought together with 
members of Parliament – and the IGC, in which such governments once 
again exercise their full prerogatives. Such sequence may have given rise 
to some “two-level games.”31 For example, some governments adopted 
30 See Notre Europe’s first study by G. Ricard-Nihoul, Réviser les traités européens européens : le moment 
      Convention – Six arguments pour la sauvegarder, six propositions pour la réformer, Policy Paper 31, 
      December 2007.
31 On this topic, see R. Dehousse, R. Dehousse, “Au-delà du plan B,” 2007, p. 945.
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a low profile at the Convention in order to devote most of their efforts to 
the IGC, while other members downgraded their ambitions to avoid total 
rejection during the IGC. The most radical solution, other than to eliminate 
the IGC, would be to merge the latter with the Convention in order to 
harness the governments’ influence during the open discussion and deli-
beration phase. A specific agreement governments representatives would 
be necessary if possible avoiding the straitjacket of unanimity, as pre-
viously suggested.
4.3 Extend simplified revision procedures
Over and above the general revision procedure, existing Treaties are being 
subjected to special procedures which consist of dropping the unanimity 
requirement, easing the ratification procedure (subject to approval by 
Member States according to their respective rules), or even abandoning 
ratification in its entirety. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the use of two “sim-
plified revision procedures” has, to some extent, become widespread.32 
The first concerns the revision of that part of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union which deals with EU internal policies and action. 
Instead of a Convention and an IGC, these matters are now be conside-
red by the European Council, whose decision must be approved by the 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional require-
ments. Although the aim of this model is to leave a greater margin of dis-
cretion to the Member States in order to simplify their internal procedures, 
this is not actually a simplification. Moreover, it disregards the progress 
constituted by the holding of a Convention. Most importantly, inasmuch as 
this procedure should not impact the division of competencies, it appears 
useless and might as well be eliminated.
32 Article 48, paragraphs 6 and 7.
The second simplified procedure is more promising. It involves the 
so-called “passerelle” clauses which can be used to amend decision-
making procedures, where applicable, in favour of a majority decision or 
of legislative co-decision. Here too, the European Council, ruling unani-
mously, is substituted for the Convention and the IGC. As for the ratifica-
tion procedure, it is replaced by an implicit ratification technique. In other 
words, if no national parliament voices its opposition to the contemplated 
amendment within a maximum of six months, the European Council can 
adopt it. 
The advantage of this procedure in that it constitutes a first step towards 
a certain Europeanisation of the national parliaments’ role in the revision 
procedure (which also implicitly dissuades the Member States from 
resorting to national referendums). For the above-mentioned reasons, it 
would be preferable to require a minimum threshold of one-fifth of the 
Member States’ national parliaments to block the amendment under 
consideration, which would correspond to an implicit approval by four-
fifths of the Member States. Furthermore, the national parliaments should 
be consulted ahead of time to ensure that the procedure would have a 
favourable outcome. Lastly, this negative ratification technique could be 
extended to other situations.
This could be taken one step further by abandoning any ratification 
procedure for treaty amendments dealing with minor institutional matters, 
such as changes in the functioning or internal organisation of institutions. 
Such issues are more numerous and less sensitive than is supposed, such 
as the European Commission’s composition, which is already subject to 
just such a simplified revision procedure.33 In this respect, too, unanimity 
should be abandoned so as to opt for a dual “superqualified” majority 
consisting of four-fifths of the Member States, representing four-fifths of 
the populations. 
33 Article  213 of the ECT.
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The use of this type of simplified procedure will ultimately depend upon 
the progress made in reforming the general revision procedure. If the latter 
were to evolve in the direction which we advocate, the simplified revision 
procedures would lose some of their significance. 
Conclusion
   
This study constitutes the second component of Notre Europe’s research 
on the reform of the European Treaties’ revision procedure. Although the 
first presented various ways of improving the Convention’s method – the 
revision procedure’s preparatory stage – the second component mainly 
deals with the subsequent phases; i.e., the negotiation and signing of 
the Treaties within the Intergovernmental Conference, as well as their 
ratification. 
Our primary recommendation is to abandon unanimity, and therefore the 
EU Member States’ individual veto rights, at these two key moments of 
the reform process. Our aim was to demonstrate that the status quo is 
unsustainable. A majority of four-fifths of the States, or a dual majority 
also requiring four-fifths of the Union’s population (if only to persuade 
the “large” States, which would thereby increase their relative power) 
seem more appropriate the rights they have. Certain guarantees could be 
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afforded to minority States, such as the option to withdraw, not to alter 
“acquired under the existing treaties. 
A second recommendation concerns the need for greater integration of 
the various phases of the revision procedure: first by merging the IGC 
with the Convention, and secondly by permitting interaction between this 
Convention/IGC and the national parliamentary assemblies called upon 
to ratify the Draft Treaty (or still other groups, allowing a dialogue to take 
place with citizens in the event of a referendum). Other factors may also 
promote a certain “Europeanisation” of the ratification procedure, such as 
a common agenda, which would further legitimise, or even facilitate, the 
revision procedure.
Another governing idea which emerges from this study is to limit the scope 
of future revision treaties by making them more targeted. Focusing them 
on relatively delimited issues  would undoubtedly facilitate the process 
of reaching an agreement (while not excluding the option of working out 
package deals). Should the ratification procedure fail it would also make 
it to rework a treaty. That would allow the maximum benefit to be derived 
from simplified revision procedures while also making it easier to pinpoint, 
where applicable, issues that may require a referendum in certain countries. 
Moreover, more targeted revision treaties would more easily integrate the 
special arrangements required to meet the most reticent Member States’ 
specific needs. In a way, this would be a return to Jean Monnet’s “small 
steps” approach, applied to the reform of European Treaties.
ANNEX
Article 48 of the TEU
Ordinary revision procedure
2. …
3. …
A conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States 
shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of deter-
mining by common accord the amendments to be made to the Treaties. 
Such amendments shall be adopted by a four-fifths majority of the 
Member States (representing the Member States comprising at least four-
fifths of the population of said States).
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by four-fifths of 
the Member States (representing the Member States comprising at least 
four-fifths of the population of such States) in accordance with their res-
pective constitutional requirements.
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A blocking minority must include at least (two or three) Member States, 
failing which a four-fifths majority shall be deemed attained.
5. If, eighteen months after the signature of the treaty amending the 
Treaties, in accordance with paragraph 4, subsection 1, less than four-
fifths of the Member States have ratified it and one or more Member States 
have encountered difficulties in proceeding with ratification, the matter 
shall be referred to the European Council. Acting by a four-fifths majority 
of the Member States representing the Member States comprising at 
least four-fifths of the population of said States, the European Council 
may determine that the ratification process has been interrupted, or set 
a new time limit.
6. Those Member States which will have not ratified the treaty amending 
the Treaties may withdraw from the European Union, in accordance with 
Article 50.
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